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LI-WEN LIN*
Legal Transplants through Private Contracting:
Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global
Supply Chains as an Example
The legal transplant literature typically focuses on legal trans-
plants through governmental channels (e.g., legislative or judiciary
processes). This Article, however, directs attention to a generally ig-
nored phenomenon: legal transplants through private contracting in
the globalization age. Private actors have transplanted a variety of
private and public laws across jurisdictions through contracting for
over a decade. This Article argues that codes of vendor conduct in
global supply chains are a vivid example of this type of legal trans-
plantation. Given that these vendor codes can be interpreted as legal
transplants through private contracting, this Article further examines
the transplant effects in China, one of the many receiving countries.
Finally, this Article proffers a theoretical analysis of the comparative
advantages and disadvantages of legal transplants through private
contracting.
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of legal transplants can be traced back thousands of
years.1 An early wave of large-scale legal transplants was driven by
colonialism. Legal transplants could be viewed as a tool for colonists
to control their new settlements. In the post-World War II period, a
large number of newly independent states borrowed laws from west-
ern countries. To a great extent, such borrowings still reflected the
legacy of colonialism. The legal transplants during the colonial and
the post-World War II periods tended to be blanket transplants of a
certain legal system, which facilitated the formation of legal families.
In the late 1980s, the legal reforms of former socialist countries initi-
ated another wave of legal transplants. More recently, global
* Paul F. Lazarsfeld Fellow, Department of Sociology, Columbia University;
JSD (2008), LLM (2005), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I am grateful to
Professors Cynthia Williams and Margaret Blair for giving me inspiration. I also ap-
preciate comments by Professors Tom Ginsburg, Mathias Reimann, and anonymous
reviewers. Errors remain my own.
1. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW
22-24 (1974) (taking the ancient Near Eastern provisions concerning a goring ox
around eighteenth century B.C. as a legal transplant example).
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economic integration has become a powerful engine pushing the wave
of legal transplants to its apex.
In the era of globalization, legal reforms at the individual state
level usually transfer fragments of rules from various legal systems
and integrate the fragments into a single law.2 The concept of legal
families that may be deemed a colonial legacy is expected to dimin-
ish. A parallel idea to the combination of fragmented rules from
different foreign sources into a single law in a national legal reform is
the legal standardization or harmonization, particularly in the global
finance and trade arena. International governmental, semi-govern-
mental, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are the major
contributors to legal standardization and harmonization today. At
present, there are hard and soft approaches to facilitate that goal.3
The hard approach is notably illustrated by the legal interactions be-
tween the WTO and its members, or between the EU and its Member
States. The soft approach can be seen in examples such as OECD
Corporate Governance Principles, UNCITRAL Model Law on Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration, and UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts. The impetus behind these
projects is to reduce transaction costs for international market par-
ticipants as well as the hope to improve the institutional
environments of receiving countries. The transplanted laws under
the standardization or harmonization movement are usually prod-
ucts of international negotiation and conciliation, rather than
wholesale adoptions of any particular legal system. For example, the
OECD Principles on Corporate Governance contain elements of the
Anglo-American shareholder model and the European stakeholder
model. States generally play a key role in this transplant process be-
cause the standardized rules are made by states at the international
level, and the laws usually need to be incorporated into a legal sys-
tem through legislative processes at the national level. Given that
standardized or harmonized laws are usually mixtures of different
legal sources, every country, whether developed or developing, sub-
ject to these laws may treat them as legal transplants to a certain
extent.4 However, the transplant aspect tends to be more striking for
2. See Takao Tanase, Global Markets and the Evolution of Law in China and
Japan, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 873, 876 (2006).
3. Legal standardization and harmonization cover a wide range of approaches
with variations of coerciveness: legally-binding agreements backed by enforcement
mechanisms, economic enticement, non-binding principles intended to provide gui-
dance, and foreign technical assistance programs. The hard approach refers to
measures backed by legal enforcement, while the soft approach refers to measures not
backed by legal enforcement.
4. Developed countries may treat harmonized laws as legal transplants, see e.g.,
Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law
Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998) (analyzing the transplant of
the European continental principle of bona fides into the British contract law through
the EU Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts).
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developing countries because they usually have a weak voice in the
international lawmaking process and relatively limited development
of their legal institutions. Some scholars caution against the possible
dangers of overzealous legal standardization and harmonization to
developing countries. 5 Professor Katharina Pistor in particular envi-
sions the potentially harmful effects resulting from ignorance of the
interdependence of legal rules embedded in a legal system and the
adaptation process operated by local law users.6
According to contemporary legal transplant scholarship, the
state (the governmental organs, particularly the legislative branch) is
the major conveyor of foreign law, holding the power over whether
and how to transplant. The transplanted objects are usually formal
law codified in a legal system. The transplant motivations are nor-
mally associated with political or governmental functions, such as
regulating a new national problem, pursuing foreign policy interests,
or gaining governmental legitimacy.7
A much less noticed phenomenon occurring in the globalization
age is that law can be transplanted by non-state actors. Some non-
state actors also play an important transplant role in the legal stand-
ardization and harmonization movement. For example, the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), a non-profit, pri-
vate sector organization, develops international standards for
financial reporting; the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO), which includes public and private securities
regulators, develops international principles of securities regulation.8
But these non-state actors usually still follow the typical transplant
method, which involves government legislation/regulation processes
at the national level. This Article discusses another type of legal
transplants through private actors: borrowing law through private
contacting. Through the channel of contracting, private transactors
have been "smuggling" tons of regulatory law across borders for over
5. See, e.g., Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on De-
veloping Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97 (2002); Graham Mayeda, Developing
Disharmony? The SPS and TBT Agreements and The Impact of Harmonization on
Developing Countries, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 737 (2004); Michael Trebilcock & Robert
Howse, A Cautious View of International Harmonization: Implications from Breton's
Theory of Competitive Governments, in COMPETITION AND STRUCTURE: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF COLLECTIVE DECISION (Gianluigi Galeotti et al. eds., 2000) (arguing that
policy diversity is important to promote competitive governments).
6. See Pistor, supra note 5.
7. See Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology,
Legal History and Argentina Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J.
COMP. L. 839, 847 (2003) (analyzing why a receiving country would decide to make a
legal transplant).
8. See International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), About Us, at http'/
www.iasb.org/About+Us/International+Accounting+Standards+Board+-+About+Us.
htm; International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Applications for
Membership, at http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=memberapps (last vis-
ited Aug. 25, 2008).
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a decade. This phenomenon is rarely detected by the radar of legal
transplantation. The purpose of this Article is to direct attention to
this specific type of legal transplantation.
International commercial arbitration may be put into this cate-
gory. Arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism is increasingly
popular with international commercial actors. By virtue of arbitra-
tion or through choice of law clauses in private contracts, foreign
legal rules that would be otherwise inapplicable may be contractually
transmitted in a given dispute. An advantage of arbitration is that it
can largely, though not completely, circumvent local legal institutions
that are incapable of delivering acceptable adjudicatory outcomes to
the contracting parties.9 This is an important advantage, especially
for contracts to be enforced in countries where rule of law is weak or
lacking. Professor Inga Markovits names this kind of legal transplan-
tation "the potted transplant": "self-contained organisms that carry
their own foundation and substance with them and that, like a
houseplant, can be placed anywhere the purchaser desires (and the
light is right)."10 The potted transplant is a form of "private ordering
as an alternative to public law reform."'1 Note that although arbitra-
tion law appears neutral in that it gives contracting parties great
latitude regarding their choice of procedural and substantive rules,
the international arbitration practices between western and nonwes-
tern transactors usually show a tendency toward westernization.1 2
This makes the legal transplant feature of international arbitration
more prominent in the eyes of nonwestern parties.
This Article proffers another example of legal transplants via
private contracting: multinational companies' codes of vendor con-
duct in their global procurement contracts. Codes of vendor conduct
refer to a set of supplier eligibility criteria structured with social and
environmental standards established internally by a buyer company
itself or externally by NGOs; they are usually accompanied by an in-
ternal or external auditing system. Examples of such codes of vendor
9. The reason why it is not a complete circumvention is that if a contracting
party does not voluntarily comply with an arbitration award, the other party may
seek enforcement by local courts. When the award is to be enforced by local courts, the
quality of local legal institutions affects contract enforcement. See Randall Peer-
enboom, Seek Truth From Facts: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of Arbitration
Awards in the PRC, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 249 (2001) (using the enforcement of arbitra-
tion awards by the Chinese courts to test the development of rule of law in China);
Daniel Berkowitz et al., Legal Institutions and International Trade Flows, 26 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 163 (2004) (arguing that domestic institutions remain important in the global
trade because global traders still rely on local legal systems when contracts or arbitra-
tion awards are not voluntarily complied; based on the incomplete contract theory,
complex goods exporters suffer more when the local legal institutions are weak).
10. See Inga Markovits, Exporting Law Reform - But Will it Travel?, 37 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 95, 99 (2004).
11. See id.
12. See Philip J. McConnaughay, Rethinking the Role of Law and Contracts in
East-West Commercial Relationships, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 427 (2001).
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conduct in global supply chains include the Gap Code of Vendor Con-
duct, Wal-Mart Standards for Vendor Partners, HP Supplier Code of
Conduct, and many corporations' procurement policies that refer to
standards such as SA8000 or ISO 14001. Although a great body of
literature on global labor and environmental governance discusses at
length the potential and limitations of such private codes as a trans-
national and nongovernmental regulatory mechanism, no study has
yet looked at the codes from a legal transplant perspective. 13 There-
fore, a major purpose of this Article is to explain how the private
codes in global commerce can be interpreted as a form of legal trans-
plantation through private contracting.
Currently, a large and growing number of multinational compa-
nies adopt codes of vendor conduct into their supplier selection
requirements. At first glance, the proliferation of such codes running
through global supply chains and getting to developing countries may
simply be deemed a replication and transmission of business strate-
gies between corporations, which are a result of private economic
competition. The typical notion of legal transplantation, which con-
tains sovereignty and legitimacy elements, seems irrelevant to the
proliferation of such business practices. But the underlying configur-
ation of business transactions in global supply chains is more
complex than that. As this Article shows, multinational companies
transform international as well as their home-country laws into con-
crete legal obligations by contracting with companies in developing
countries. Although it is well-known that many business strategies
have been turned into contractual obligations, in the eyes of suppliers
especially in developing countries, codes of vendor conduct have regu-
latory features that other business strategies do not possess. From
the perspective of these suppliers, the regulatory features of vendor
codes derive from the combination of the following arrangements: a
contractual obligation of implementing the social and environmental
13. The volume of the literature on corporate codes of conduct is huge. See, e.g.,
Dara O'Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of La-
bor Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL'Y STUD. J. 1 (2003); Sean Murphy, Taking
Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 389 (2005) (arguing that governments should provide carrots and sticks for corpo-
rate codes of conduct to be effective); David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to
Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at Interna-
tional Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 952-60 (2004); Thomas F. McInerney, Putting
Regulation Before Responsibility: The Limits of Voluntary Corporate Social Responsi-
bility, (Gwu Law School Public Law Research Paper No.123 Oct. 10, 2005), available
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=658081; Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit:
Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 78-81
(2002); Mark B. Baker, Tightening the Toothless Vise: Codes of Conduct and the Amer-
ican Multinational Enterprise, 20 Wis. INT'L L.J. 89 (2001); Lance Compa & Tashia
Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, Enforcing International Labor Rights Through Corporate
Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663 (1995); Charles Sabel et al., Ratch-
eting Labor Standards: Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global
Workplace (2000), available at http:/papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?absttractid=262178.
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standards that used to be within the sphere of public regulation; the
designated contract enforcement mechanisms that are independent
from weak legal institutions in many developing countries, and; the
sanction of losing business, which is ultimately judged by multina-
tional companies.
The thesis in this Article is that multinational companies,
backed by their strong bargaining power, have transmitted a new le-
gal order to developing countries through contracting with local
suppliers and that such transmission may be interpreted as a form of
legal transplantation. This kind of legal transplantation is different
from the usual type in several aspects. First, it is multinational com-
panies (non-state actors) rather than states playing a key role in the
transplant process. Multinational companies' strong bargaining
power as the source of authority and non-legal institutions as con-
tract enforcement mechanisms make the transplants possible.
Second, the vendor codes themselves are not government-mandated
laws. Yet, they have an effect of approximately reflecting interna-
tional law or multinational companies' home-country law or even the
already transplanted but poorly enforced law in receiving countries.
Third, this kind of transplantation is a response primarily to market
demands rather than to political considerations. Economic and social
pressures in the multinational companies' home countries are the ul-
timate forces behind this type of legal transplantation.
When a law is transplanted from one state to another, the viabil-
ity of the law in the new environment depends on numerous factors
external to the quality of the transplanted law itself. Basically, the
outcome of a legal transplant can be mutation, withering, or, albeit
rarely, unscathed survival. Looking at vendor codes in global supply
chains as a form of legal transplantation raises the question of what
the results of such legal transplants are. Since vendor codes in global
supply chains are mainly implemented at factories in developing
countries, this Article takes China, characterized as "the world's fac-
tory," as a case study. China provides interesting perspectives on the
circumstances under which vendor codes in global supply chains can
be easily assimilated into a receiving country and on the extent to
which the legal transplants may be regarded as successful in terms of
the intended purposes.
As Alan Watson argues, human history is full of works recording
the importance of legal transplants in the development of law. 14
Globalization unquestionably makes these works much more conspic-
uous than ever. The revolution of manufacturing modes in the
globalization age has brought about innovations in legal transplant
methods. More research is necessary to examine the various kinds of
legal transplant methods and to compare their advantages and disad-
14. See generally WATSON, supra note 1.
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vantages in different settings. This Article draws attention to these
issues which are of increasing importance in the globalization age.
Such a study is important and useful for international and national
policymakers when making legal reforms.
This Article is arranged as follows: Section I? explains why ven-
dor codes in global supply chains can be interpreted as a form of legal
transplantation through private contracting. It considers the trans-
plant motivation, objects, and process. Based on the understanding
that vendor codes in global supply chains are legal transplants, Sec-
tion III takes China, a major receiving country, as a case study to
illustrate how the transplanted legal order interacts with the local
environments. This Article particularly compares the different re-
sults of the imported social and environmental standards, i.e.,
SA8000 and ISO 14001. Section IV proffers some theoretical contri-
butions to the literature on legal transplantation.
II. THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF VENDOR CODES IN GLOBAL SUPPLY
CHAINS AS LEGAL TRANSPLANTS
Although there are a large number of academic studies examin-
ing vendor codes in global supply chains, none considers the vendor
codes as legal transplants. Therefore, it is important to explain why
vendor codes in global procurement contracts square with the concept
of legal transplantation through private contracting. To illustrate the
structure of the vendor codes as legal transplants through private
contacting, this section analyzes the transplant motivation, objects,
and process.
A. The Transplant Motivation
Codes of vendor conduct require suppliers to meet certain labor
and environmental protection standards in the production process.
The labor standards generally include topics concerning child labor,
forced labor, health and safety measures in workplaces, freedom of
association and right to collective bargaining, discrimination, work-
ing hours, and compensation. The environmental standards usually
involve hazardous substance management (e.g., safe handling, ship-
ping, storage, recycling, and disposal of hazardous materials), waste
management, air emission management, energy efficiency measures,
and other pollution prevention requirements.
But why do multinational companies require suppliers to meet
labor and environmental standards in the production process? These
standards seem irrelevant to the tangible quality of products them-
selves. The answer to the question has social, economic, and business
management aspects.
The social aspect relates to the changes in consumer expectation
in developed markets. Prior to globalization, companies only ran a
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race with domestic competitors who were subject to the same cost ba-
sis and regulatory environment. In the globalization age, however,
the competition is ruthless, pushing every company to compete re-
gardless of its size, origin, and industry. In order to survive in the
competitive global market, companies have adopted new business
management methods, one of which is to reshape supply chains for
cost reduction. An important aspect of the reshaping is the extension
of supply sources from domestic to global, particularly in order to tap
into the reservoir of cheap labor and natural resources in developing
countries. The supply manufacturers in developing countries that
contract with multinational businesses are usually companies that
are small when measured on an international scale. These small
manufacturers profit from the multinationals' cost-reduction strat-
egy. They make profits not from selling advanced knowledge, but
from selling cheap labor and materials. To be competitive and profita-
ble, these suppliers do not pay much attention to labor and
environmental protection concerns and sometimes even egregiously
violate laws, gaining profits at the expense of workers' health and
local environments. Moreover, the regulatory institutions in develop-
ing countries are usually incapable, or unwilling because of the
national comparative advantage concern, to control these harmful
practices. Meanwhile, product competition in developed markets has
become so fierce that multinational companies are pressed to squeeze
every penny out of their operations, including their supply chains.
Therefore, multinational companies do not have strong incentives to
consider the production processes of their suppliers in developing
countries. Price is their primary, if not only, concern. Workers and
environments in developing countries suffer in this unregulated
global supply chain. Since the 1990s, a large number of news reports
have revealed multinational companies' massive labor exploitation
and environmental destruction in developing countries. 15 The revela-
tions of corporate irresponsibility have caused consumers and NGOs
in developed markets to boycott the companies and to initiate the
movement of corporate social responsibility (CSR).16 The CSR move-
ment signals that corporations are expected not only to provide goods,
services, and employment, but also to undertake social and environ-
mental obligations in proportion to their economic power. Codes of
vendor conduct in global supply chains constitute an important
15. See, e.g., Philip Shenon, Made in the U.S.A.? - Hard Labor on a Pacific Is-
land/A Special Report.; Saipan Sweatshops Are No American Dream, N.Y. TIMES,
July 18, 1993, § 1, at 1 (reporting that labor exploitations were found in the suppliers
of Arrow, Liz Claiborne, Gap, Montgomery Ward, Geoffrey Beene, Eddie Bauer, and
Levi-Strauss).
16. For the anti-sweatshop movement since 1990s, see KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT &
RicHARD B. FREEMAN, CAN LABOR STANDARDS IMPROVE UNDER GLOBALIZATION? 147-50
(2003) (including a timeline of anti-sweatshop activities in the 1990s).
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branch of the CSR movement. They are a response to social change,
and social change has practical economic and business significance.
In economic terms, although outsourcing to suppliers in develop-
ing countries where cheap labor and loose regulatory control can
reduce certain costs, it does not guarantee reduction in total produc-
tion costs. In economic parlance, "the costs of production are the sum
of transformation costs and transaction costs. '1 7 Global outsourcing
may reduce transformation costs (e.g., labor wages); however, it may
also increase transaction costs. The transaction costs including how
to control the quality of production processes (including labor and en-
vironmental conditions) would be very likely to surge given that the
exchanges are between parties in markets with great distance in
space, business culture, and institutions. Therefore, it is important to
ensure that, for a profitable outsourcing, if there is any increase in
transaction costs, such increase would not eliminate the benefits de-
rived from reduction in transformation costs.
In business terms, it is a question about supply chain manage-
ment-how to manage risks in the lengthened supply chains. Since
companies do not have direct control over their suppliers' factories,
the core mission of supply chain management is to ensure the smooth
flow of supply. Price, delivery speed, quality, and reliability are the
typical focuses of supply chain management. From a multinational
company's standpoint, there are multiple layers of suppliers, from its
first-tier suppliers, with which it has direct relationships, to its sup-
pliers' suppliers with which it has no contact at all. Multinational
buyers may very well argue that they are incapable of controlling
their suppliers, in particular those hidden under the multiple layers
of contracting. Ostensibly, the shift of manufacturing to suppliers in
developing countries and the invisibility of suppliers may justify
shifting labor and environmental protection costs associated with
manufacturing processes to the suppliers. This is an important eco-
nomic reason for multinational buyers to extensively utilize suppliers
in developing countries. However, sweatshop practices and adverse
environmental impacts hidden in the extended and entangled supply
chains and traced back to multinational companies have become in-
creasingly known throughout the world. This has brought a deluge of
condemnation by consumers in their major markets. This indicates
that supply chain management must obtain not only high quality
products with low prices by timely delivery but also do so in a socially
and environmentally responsible manner.
In short, multinational companies adopt codes of vendor conduct
in their global supply chains because of social and economic pressures
in their major markets. Codes of vendor conduct in global supply
17. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 27-28 (1990).
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chains are a tool to satisfy social demands and to control transaction
costs and risks arising from socially or environmentally irresponsible
conduct by their suppliers. The transplant motivation is driven by
multinational companies' enlightened self-interest-responsively to
repair their tarnished images, or preventively to maintain customer
goodwill. 18
B. The Transplanted Law
By reviewing codes of vendor conduct in global supply chains, it
is easy to find that the contents of such codes usually refer to three
categories of legal texts: international law, the multinational com-
pany's home-country law, and the supplier's country law. The former
two types agree with the notion of legal transplantation. The scope of
"international law" in this section includes hard and soft law. The
distinction between them lies in whether the law can be enforced by
formal legal sanction, though sometimes it may be proper to interpret
the relationship between hard and soft law as a spectrum rather than
a dichotomy. 19
With regard to social standards, codes of vendor conduct fre-
quently refer to International Labor Organization (ILO) Labor
Conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.20 These international con-
ventions and declarations aim at setting up internationally minimum
labor standards. One may argue that vendor codes citing these inter-
national laws cannot be treated as legal transplants because many
developing countries have already signed and ratified these interna-
tional laws. This argument is true only to a limited extent. A large
number of vendor codes refer to the ILO conventions on hours of work
and freedom of association, but these conventions are not ratified by
18. See, e.g., Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling
Schemes: The Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights
Through Private Initiatives, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus 111, 114-15 (1998) (arguing
that self-interest motivation is the predominant reason multinational companies
adopt codes of conduct); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corpo-
rate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78
GEO. L.J. 1559, 1573-1600 (1990) (providing a historical review of the growth of codes
of conducts fostered by scandals); Murphy, supra note 13, at 397-403 (explaining the
impetus for the proliferation of codes of conduct); ELLIOT & FREEMAN, supra note 16,
42-46 (2003) (describing firms' practice of adopting codes of conduct because they be-
lieve that "consumers will penalize them if they do not undertake corrective action"
and analyzing firms' cost-benefit calculation of adopting higher labor standards).
19. See John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock, Introduction: Hard Choices and
Soft Law in Sustainable Global Governance, in HARD CHOICE, SoFr LAW 9 (Kirton &
Trebilcock eds., 2004).
20. See, e.g., Social Accountability 8000, available at http://www.sa-intl.org/; Ap-
ple Supplier Code of Conduct, available at http://www.apple.com/; The IKEA Way on
Purchasing Home Furnishing Products, available at http://www.ikea.com/.
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major exporting countries such as Brazil, China, and Thailand. 21
More importantly, signatory states may not actually implement these
international conventions at the national level. According to the or-
thodoxy of international law, these laws have no direct application to
corporations and individuals when the state is not a signatory or
when the state is a signatory but does not incorporate the respective
conventions into domestic law.2 2 Therefore, when international labor
law is incorporated into vendor codes and further transformed into
contractual obligations, it can be deemed a direct application of inter-
national law to private entities in developing countries.
In addition to the reference to the international legal instru-
ments of which states are the addressees, codes of vendor conduct
also consult international instruments that target corporations, such
as the UN Global Compact. 23 The contents of these standards usually
link back to the ILO conventions and UN declarations previously
mentioned.
With regard to environmental issues, frequent references include
the ISO 14001 Environmental Management System and the EU Eco-
Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS). 24 In contrast to the inter-
national labor standards dictating substantive requirements, the
international environmental instruments referred to in the codes of
conduct are procedural rules. They offer standardized environmental
management process and auditing principles. Vendor codes in global
supply chains therefore transplant the internationally-standardized
environmental procedural rules.
Codes of vendor conduct also incorporate multinational compa-
nies' home-country laws. When a multinational company adopts a set
of universal standards for its worldwide operations, the multina-
tional company's home-country law is an important reference. An
explicit example can be seen in the code of vendor conduct of New
21. For example, major developing countries that export labor-intensive products,
such as Brazil, China, Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam do not ratify Convention 1
(hours of work for industry) and Convention 87 (freedom of association). India does
not ratify Convention 87. Indonesia and Russia do not ratify Convention 1. See Inter-
national Labour Organization Database of International Labour Standards Country
Profiles, at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newcountryframeE.htm (last visited Sept.
3, 2007).
22. See David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of
Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L
L. 931, 947-51 (2004).
23. The UN Global Compact is an international initiative with an objective to pro-
mote corporate social responsibility and to advance ten universal principles in the
areas of human rights, labor, environments, and anti-corruption. See www.unglobal
compact.org/.
24. For detailed discussion about ISO 14000, see Section III of this Article. The
EU Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) is a management tool for companies
and other organizations to evaluate, report, and improve their environmental per-
formance. For more information, see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/index en.
htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
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Balance, a U.S.-based branded athletic shoe company. In New Bal-
ance's Supplier Code of Conduct, the safety and sanitary conditions of
workplaces are measured against the benchmark set by the United
States Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).25
Nike, a U.S.-based branded sportswear giant, also requires its foot-
wear suppliers to provide indoor air quality equal to or better than
the limits established by U.S. OSHA.2 6
The standards set forth in codes of vendor conduct may differ
from applicable laws in countries where suppliers operate their facto-
ries. A typical resolution to the conflict is to choose the stricter
standard. 27 Therefore, foreign law (including international law and
multinational companies' home-country law) adopted by codes of ven-
dor conduct may actually control a given labor or environmental
issue.
Note that the transplanted law here is public law and regulatory
in nature. Part of the transplanted law involves human rights such
as freedom of association and prohibition on forced labor. This is an
important point that we should bear in mind, given that business and
commercial laws are generally assumed more easily to transplant
than human rights law because of the differences in their institu-
tional sensitivity.28 This nature of the transplanted law may
significantly affect transplant outcomes.
C. The Transplant Process
1. Private Contracting
Codes of vendor conduct are real legal obligations in global sup-
ply contracts. Although supply contracts are usually confidential and
not accessible to the public, publicly available information, such as
corporate statements posted on companies' websites and material
contracts filed with SEC, has demonstrated the prevalence of codes of
vendor conduct as contractual obligations. Professor Michael
Vandenbergh recently conducted a study concerning the pervasive-
ness of environmental standards in the procurement policies of the
25. See New Balance Supplier Code of Conduct, available at http://www.newbal-
ance.com/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).
26. See Nike's press releases about corporate responsibility initiatives in 2000
and 2001 (on file with author).
27. See, e.g., Article II of SA8000, available at http://www.sa-intl.org/; the Ethical
Trading Initiative Base Code, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/Z/lib/base/code-en.shtml;
Nike Code of Conduct (e.g., hours of work/overtime); IBM Supplier Conduct Principles
(e.g., child labor, working hours, etc.).
28. See Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation,
(Center for International Development at Harvard University, Working Paper No. 44,
Apr. 2000) (arguing that "political, social, and cultural factors are more important in
determining the patterns of legal migration for constitutional and human rights laws,
ideas, and institutions than they are for business, commercial and economic laws,
ideas, and institutions").
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top ten companies in various sectors as identified by Hoovers, a Dun
& Bradstreet affiliate. 29 He found that, based on the policies and
statements disclosed by the companies themselves, at least half of
the top ten companies in various sectors have imposed some type of
environmental requirements on their suppliers. He also found that
eleven of the fifty-two supply agreements (21%) filed with the SEC
during the fourth quarter of 2001 include environmental require-
ments for suppliers, and some of the environmental standards
imposed are not even required by the environmental law in the sup-
pliers' countries.
According to the information found with the phrases "code of ven-
dor conduct" and "supplier code of conduct" in the LexisNexis SEC
EDGARPlus Exhibits database, a number of companies such as
Tommy Hilfiger, a premium apparel company, also include labor
standards (e.g., SA8000) in the contracts with their suppliers.30 Hew-
lett-Packard, a well-known computer equipment company, openly
discloses its standard contract concerning HP's code of vendor con-
duct on its corporate website. The contract is called "the Supplier
Social and Environmental Responsibility Agreement," which requires
all of its suppliers to sign the agreement and comply with HP's sup-
plier code of conduct.31
2. Contract Enforcement
Contract enforcement plays an important role in the legal trans-
plant process. Legal scholarship commonly finds gaps between the
law on the books and the law in practice after transplants. Codes of
vendor conduct confront the same problem. Multinational companies
such as Nike, Gap, and Wal-Mart, provide vivid case examples show-
ing that simply transforming codes of vendor conduct into contractual
obligations does not warrant compliance by suppliers in developing
countries.3 2 Therefore, how to ensure that suppliers actually respect
29. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Con-
tracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913 (2007).
30. See, e.g., Tommy Hilfiger Corp. (Form 10-K, Exhibit 10. Material Contracts,
filed on June 26, 2001), Phoenix Footwear Group Inc. (Form 10-Q, Exhibit 10. Mate-
rial Contracts, filed on Nov. 15, 2005), Stride Rite Corp. (Form 10-K, Exhibit 10.
Material Contracts, filed on Mar. 1, 2000), Marvel Entertainment Group Inc. (Form
10-Q, Exhibit 10. Material Contracts, filed on Aug. 21 1998). This author does not
argue that the information found here was complete.
31. See HP's Supplier Social and Environmental Responsibility Agreement, avail-
able at http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/globalcitizenship/environment/pdf/supagree.pdf.
32. Nike established the code of conduct for its suppliers in 1992, but in the late
1990s, Nike was seriously charged for its suppliers' labor exploitation despite the
code's existence. The famous case is Kasky v. Nike Inc., 79 Cal. App. 4th 16; 27 Cal.
4th 939. Wal-Mart also adopts a code of conduct for its suppliers but is still infamous
for its suppliers' poor labor performance. See also Leslie Kaufman & David Gonzalez,
Made in Squalor: Reform has Limits: Labor Standards Clash with Global Reality,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at Al (reporting Gap intensified monitoring efforts because
suppliers failed to comply with Gap's code).
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the social and environmental standards in the production process has
been a challenging question for global buyers. A prevailing solution
by global buyers is to use internal and external auditing systems to
enforce the contractual obligations.
An internal audit is conducted by trained employee auditors of a
buyer company. There is a trend, however, that global buyers are also
using external auditing by specialist auditing firms or NGOs. 33 The
typical audit includes three main aspects: a physical inspection (a
factory tour); interviews with employees; and a review of records con-
cerning payroll, tax, insurance coverage, and environmental
protection processes. 34 Whether audits are announced or unan-
nounced depends on different audit purposes and strategies. They are
periodically conducted. After the audit, a report and corresponding
corrective action plans are produced. The audited supplier would be
given some time to correct identified problems.
There is an interesting question why global buyers use internal
and external auditing to ensure suppliers' performance of the social
and environmental obligations in global procurement contracts. Typi-
cally, there are three alternatives to enforce international
commercial contracts, including formal procedures (i.e., in courts), in-
formal mechanisms (e.g., reputation, networks, barter), and
international arbitration. 35 Based on this understanding, why do
multinational companies favor internal and/or external auditing sys-
tems over the conventional enforcement mechanisms to enforce the
social and environmental terms in supply contracts? This question
may also be translated into a general inquiry of why state courts as a
legal institution for dispute resolution are avoided and a new extra-
legal enforcement institution is favored. The point of looking at the
relationship between legal and extra-legal contract enforcement
mechanisms is not to find systematic superiority of one over the
other. Rather, scholars have recognized that each enforcement mech-
anism has its strengths and weaknesses for different kinds of
transactions. 36 Thus, we should examine each contract enforcement
33. For detailed discussion on the rise of such external auditing in the global sup-
ply chain and its theoretical implications, see Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role
for Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325 (2008).
34. For detailed discussion about how the audits are conducted, see e.g., Ivanka
Mamic, IMPLEMENTING CODES OF CONDUCT: How BUSINESSES MANAGE SOCIAL PER-
FORMANCE IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN 127-31, 202-20, 276-94 (2004); JILL ESBENSHADE,
MONITORING SWEATSHOPS 69-82 (2004); Nike, Inc., NIKE FY04 Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility Report (disclosing how Nike's M inspection, SHAPE audit and FLA
independent audit are conducted).
35. See Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and
Enforcement in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517 (2006) (giving a review of
formal and informal contract enforcement mechanisms).
36. See, e.g., Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: To-
wards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2338 (2004)
(arguing that "the nature of the underlying transaction will consistently determine
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mechanism in the specific context of codes of vendor conduct in global
supply chains; this will reveal the comparative advantages of using
auditing systems.
Courts are not a favored enforcement institution because they
have intrinsic and extrinsic limitations in the specific context of en-
forcing vendor codes. Although codes of vendor conduct adopted by
multinational companies bear much resemblance to each other, the
social and environmental standards are very industry- or even firm-
specific.37 They vary depending on types of products, production pro-
cedures, and locations of factories. To determine whether a supplier's
measures meet the standards set forth in the vendor code requires
professional knowledge and experience. The standards in the vendor
codes are more like regulations administered by labor and environ-
mental agencies, which are somewhat outside courts' expertise.
Moreover, disputes in courts over irresponsible outsourcing may at-
tract public attention, and global buyers cannot easily disconnect
themselves from the irresponsibility label attached by the public.
This certainly spells trouble for their businesses. Global buyers pre-
fer a way that they can retain confidentiality of production processes
and have a chance to correct the problem before it becomes exposed to
the public. Besides these inherent limitations, courts may not be
available or reliable in many developing countries where suppliers
mainly locate.
Global buyers may also turn to reputation to enforce the social
and environmental standards in supply contracts. However, reputa-
tion as a contract enforcement mechanism is effective only under
certain conditions. 38 For example, reputation can work only where
transactors can communicate the information accurately and inex-
pensively to other transactors in the business circle. 39 Most of the
pertinent scholarship builds on examples where certain ethnic ties,
closely knit communities, and trade associations in certain industries
facilitate the transmission of reputation information; such mecha-
nisms are usually constrained by geography.40 However, buyers and
the superior method of enforcement"); Ariel Porat, Enforcing Contracts in Dysfunc-
tional Legal Systems: The Close Relationship between Public and Private Orders, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2459 (2000) (arguing responses in private ordering differ according to
the underlying reasons for a dysfunctional public order).
37. See generally MAMc, supra note 34; see also Gare Smith & Dan Feldman,
Company Codes of Conduct and International Standards: An Analytical Comparison
Vol. 1 (2003-2004) (a report published by the World Bank Group Corporate Social
Responsibility Practice), available at the World Bank Document & Reports Database,
http://www.worldbank.org/reference/.
38. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 151-58 (1996).
39. See id. at 153.
40. See, e.g., Barak D. Richman, How Communities Create Economic Advantages:
Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 383 (2006) (arguing
that the combination of family-based reputation mechanisms and community-based
enforcement institutions allows the trading of valuable and portable articles); Lisa
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suppliers in the complex global supply chains are generally on differ-
ent continents and comprise different ethnic groups, languages, and
business cultures. Also, reputation works well only when transactors
have reputation at stake. Some small suppliers in developing coun-
tries may not take reputation seriously because the expectation of
ongoing business relationships may be diminished by uncertainties
in macroeconomic, political, and legal environments. Thus, reputa-
tion is a possible but not a sufficient enforcement mechanism in the
specific content of vendor codes in global supply chains.
Arbitration seems to be a suitable enforcement mechanism for
vendor codes in the supply chains given that it offers confidentiality,
specialized substantive and procedural rules, and expert decision-
makers. But arbitration involves situations where a dispute has al-
ready occurred. In other words, it is a remedial mechanism.
Implementation of vendor codes, however, does not only have a reme-
dial dimension but a preventive one. Since NGOs and media have
shown their ability to peek into global buyers' supply factories, global
buyers do not want to risk their reputation by solving problems ex
post facto. In this regard, the typical arbitration model does not sat-
isfy the prevention demand. To be sure, that does not mean
arbitration plays no role in this transplant process. For example,
when a buyer requires a supplier to be certified under SA8000 or ISO
14001 by an auditing firm, there is a contractual relationship be-
tween the audited party (usually a supplier) and the auditing firm.
Disputes between the audited and the auditor concerning how to in-
terpret and implement the contractual terms (including performance
and auditing standards/measures) may still be subject to arbitra-
tion.4 1 But this is a derivative question. This Article focuses on how
to enforce vendor codes between a buyer and a supplier.
Thus, neither courts, nor reputation, nor arbitration provides a
timely, proactive, and preventive solution to the compliance problem.
Global buyers, therefore, resort to a tailored enforcement mecha-
nism-internal and external auditing. Such auditing offers
confidentiality, proactive monitoring, and preventive measures.
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial
Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms and Institu-
tions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private
Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421 (2000) (giving a liter-
ature review of examples on how business and social networks facilitate the
dissemination of reputation information).
41. Such dispute resolution can be found in contracts provided by certification
firms. See the contracts disclosed by two global prominent certification bodies-RINA
(Rules for the Certification of Social Accountability Management Systems, available
at http://www.rina.orgleng/management-system/responsabilita-sociale.asp) and SGS
(General Conditions for Certification Services, available at http://www.sgs.com/terms
_andconditions.htm) (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
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Internal and external auditing keeps production processes confi-
dential and avoids unfavorable and uncontrollable exposure to the
public. The information produced in internal auditing is not publicly
accessible because the auditing process is conducted by the employ-
ees of a buyer for internal use. Unless the law mandates disclosure,
the buyer can decide whether and how to disclose the information to
the public, though the discretion has been challenged in recent years
by the rising transparency demand from consumers and NGOs. For
external auditing where a buyer uses outsiders, still only limited in-
formation is disclosed to the public. For example, when a company
uses an auditing firm to ensure social and environmental perform-
ance, the auditing firm cannot disclose confidential information
acquired in the audit without the consent of the audited. 42 Even
NGOs that provide accreditation and/or certification services such as
Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP), Social Account-
ability International (SAI), and the member organizations of
Standardization Organization International (ISO) disclose informa-
tion only about applicant factories that pass audits but not those that
fail. 43 From the global buyers' view, such confidential treatment
helps to correct the enforcement problem without paying a reputa-
tional price.
In addition, internal and external auditing is conducted periodi-
cally and sometimes with no advance notice to suppliers. Periodic
auditing and unannounced investigation are important for proactive
and preventive purposes. This is because labor and environmental
conditions can vary from moment to moment and may be temporarily
fixed if a specific date for investigation is known in advance.
Finally, besides the comparative advantages of auditing, the role
of external auditing in particular helps the operation of reputation as
contract enforcement in the global market. The external auditing ser-
vices providers, including auditing firms and NGOs, may be deemed
reputation intermediaries facilitating the collection, verification, and
dissemination of reputation information about suppliers' social and
environmental performance to global buyers. 44
42. See id. (confidentiality clauses in the contracts).
43. The list of certified facilities released by WRAP can be found at http://www.
wrapapparel.org/; WRAP even contains a statement: "We keep all information sup-
plied by participating factories confidential unless instructed otherwise. Therefore,
the list generated below contains only those factories that have provided express au-
thorization to be mentioned. As such, not all WRAP certified factories in this country
may be included." The list of certified factories released by SAI can be found at http://
www.sa-intl.org/. ISO itself does not retain a list of certified facilities; it is the concern
of organizations in each member country to provide such information. For example,
China Quality Certification Center maintains a database to search certified facilities
and check the validity of ISO 9000 and ISO 140000 certifications issued in China. See
http://www.cqc.com.cn/Chinese/search/index.asp (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
44. See Blair et al., supra note 33.
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3. Imbalance of Power
In the transplant process, it is important to consider the relation-
ship between the donors (multinational companies/global buyers
based in developed countries) and the receivers (suppliers, particu-
larly in developing countries). Based on the assumption that a
contract is a result of negotiation, what are the dynamics in the nego-
tiation process? In order to protect their corporate images,
multinational companies require suppliers to comply with codes of
vendor conduct. If the implementation of vendor codes is a gain with-
out cost for both parties, there is no question that both sides (buyers
and suppliers) would agree to incorporate the codes into contracts
without any bitter discussion. Implementation of such codes, how-
ever, entails a non-negligible increase in production costs. For
example, enhanced standards in wages, working hours, and working
conditions would certainly raise production costs. Therefore, whether
to adopt social and environmental standards into contracts and who
should be responsible for the implementation are contested between
buyers and suppliers, as these questions involve allocation of costs
and benefits between the parties.
Power is an important factor influencing the outcome of the bat-
tle. As recognized in the business and sociological literature, power is
an influential factor in defining the inter-firm relationships in supply
chains. 45 These structures are rarely balanced and may vary in dif-
ferent types of supply chains. Suppliers in developing countries
usually have weaker bargaining power than multinational companies
based in developed countries. This is particularly true for suppliers in
apparel, footwear, toy, and other industries, in which codes of vendor
conduct are very common. These industries are classic examples of
buyer-driven commodity chains. "Buyer-driven commodity chains re-
fer to those industries in which large retailers, branded marketers,
and branded manufacturers play the pivotal roles in setting up de-
45. A number of early research articles on marketing channels have examined the
power relationships between firms. See, e.g., Shelby D. Hunt & John R. Nevin, Power
in Channels of Distribution: Sources and Consequences, 11 J. MKTG. RES. 186 (1974);
Jack Kasulis & Robert E. Spekman, A Framework of the Use of Power, 14 EUR. J.
MKTG. 180 (1980). The research specifically on the power factor in the supply chain is
of more recent vintage. See, e.g., Michael Maloli & W.C. Benton, Power Influences in
the Supply Chain, 21 J. Bus. LOGISTICS 49 (2000). These studies primarily develop on
the typology of social power proposed by French and Raven. See John R.P. French, Jr.
& Bertram Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in STUDIES IN SOCIAL POWER 150-65
(Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1959). French and Raven propose five types of social power:
reward, coercive (ability to punish), legitimate (a person internalizes values because
of an obligation to accept the external influence, e.g., power from cultural values, so-
cial structure), referent (a person desires association with another person, a role or a
group), and expert (knowledge and information). Another important idea related to
the role of power between firms is the resource dependence theory proposed by Pfeffer
and Salancik. See JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL
OF ORGANIZATIONS (2003).
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centralized production networks in a variety of exporting countries,"
particularly developing counties. 46 Profits in the buyer-driven chains
are gained from the "unique combination of high value research, de-
sign, sales, marketing and financial services that allow the retailers,
branded marketers and branded manufacturers to act as strategic
brokers in linking overseas factories with evolving product niches in
the main consumer markets."47 With the power to shape consumer
demand in markets through the use of brand names and strategic
networks, the buyers (retailers, branded marketers, and branded
manufacturers) have leverage in price bargaining with suppliers 48
and in setting business conditions (e.g., vendor codes) with suppliers
in developing countries. Although a global buyer with strong bargain-
ing power may have good reasons to forgo the use of power and share
gains from a cooperative relationship with its suppliers, practical ex-
perience in developing countries suggests that global buyers in
buyer-driven commodity chains tend to maximize their bargaining
power over suppliers when inserting codes of vendor conduct in sup-
ply relationships. 49
In other words, from the view of suppliers in developing coun-
tries, codes of vendor conduct in global supply contracts match the
externally-dictated transplant under Professor Jonathan Miller's ty-
pology of legal transplants. The externally-dictated transplant
involves "a foreign individual, entity or government that indicates
the adoption of a foreign legal model as a condition for doing business
or for allowing the dominated country a measure of political auton-
omy."' 50 "If one understands this type of transplant to include all
46. See Gary Gereffi, International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Ap-
parel Commodity Chain, 48 J. INT'L ECON. 37, 46 (1999).
47. See id. As opposed to buyer-driven commodity chains, producer-driven com-
modity chains refer to "those in which large, usually transnational, manufacturers
play the central roles in coordinating production networks." The typical example of
producer-driven commodity chains is the automobile industry. Profits in the producer
commodity chain are gained from "scale, volume and technological advances."
48. See id.
49. See MAMIc, supra note 34, 102-04, 260-62 (reporting multinational companies'
insistence on vendor codes and low prices based on the 147 interviews with suppliers
in countries including Cambodia, China, Guatemala, Honduras, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Vietnam); KUAGUO GONGS! DE SHEHUI
ZEREN YU ZHONGGUO SHEHUI [SocIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS & THE CHINESE SOCIETY] 1-91 (Shen Tan & Kaiming Liu eds., 2003) (reporting
multinational companies' insistence on vendor codes and low prices based on inter-
views with suppliers in China); Helle Bank Jorgensen et al., Strengthening
Implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility in Global Supply Chains, prepared
for the Corporate Social Responsibility Practice in the Investment Climate Depart-
ment of the World Bank Group (2003) (reporting global buyers demand responsible
production and low prices); Dexter Roberts & Pete Engardio, Secrets, Lies and Sweat-
shop, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE Nov. 27, 2006, available at http://www.businessweek.
com/magazine/content06_48/b4011001.htm (reporting Chinese suppliers' compliant
about multinational companies' responsible production and low prices strategies).
50. See Miller, supra note 7, at 847.
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transplants whose acceptance is motivated by the desire to please for-
eign states, individuals or entities-whether in acquiescence to their
demands, or to take advantage of opportunities and enticements that
they offer-many different situations involve this type."51 Under the
externally-dictated transplant, the degree of the external pressure af-
fects the extent of acceptance in the receiving country. The
transplanted law is doomed to be abandoned as soon as the external
pressure disappears, unless the law has been internalized by the re-
ceiving country.52 The following section examines how a receiving
country (society) reacts to the externally-dictated transplant.
III. THE TRANSPLANT EFFECTS: CHINA AS A CASE STUDY
What are the effects of such transplants on the receiving country
(or society)? This section examines two examples of social and envi-
ronmental standards that are usually mentioned in multinational
companies' codes of vendor conduct: SA8000 and ISO 14001. The two
standards are representative because of their worldwide applicability
and popularity. They produce different outcomes after being trans-
ported by multinational companies to China. The China case study
also indicates the potential and limitations of legal transplants
through private contracting.
A. Socially Responsible Production Standards: SA8000
SA8000 is a set of auditable labor standards established by the
Council on Economic Priorities Accreditation Association (CEPAA) in
1997 and now administered by SAI. SA8000 addresses compliance
with national law, International Labor Organization Conventions,
the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Conven-
tion of the Rights of the Child.53 To measure a company's labor
protection performance, SA8000 provides criteria for nine areas in-
cluding child labor, forced labor, health and safety, freedom of
association and rights to collective bargaining, discrimination, disci-
pline, working hours, compensation, and management systems. To be
certified under SA8000, a facility must first conduct a preliminary
internal assessment of compliance with SA8000 and make any
changes to conditions and policies required by the standard. Then an
auditing company accredited by the SAI conducts an initial assess-
ment and provides corrective action requests for the applicant
facility. After making changes in accordance with the corrective ac-
tion requests, the facility contacts the auditing company to arrange a
full certification audit. If it passes the audit, the facility will be certi-
fied. Surveillance audits periodically occur thereafter. The cost of
51. See id.
52. See id. at 868.
53. See Article II of SA8000 Standard.
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obtaining a SA8000 certification can be categorized into two types:
the certification fees and the corrective/compliance costs. As to the
corrective/compliance costs, the amount can vary from facility to fa-
cility depending on factors such as the degree of non-compliance and
the number of workers.
As of March 31, 2008, China ranked as the third largest country
in terms of the number of SA8000-certified facilities and the second
largest country in terms of the number of workers covered under the
standard.54 The growth of SA8000 in China is attributable to the ex-
ternal pressure from foreign buyers. 55 I have discussed elsewhere in
great detail the SA8000 development in China so that a short sum-
mary may suffice here.5 6 Briefly speaking, the Chinese government
and suppliers generally resist SA8000. They suspect that the ulterior
motive of SA8000 and similar standards is to undercut developing
countries' competitiveness by raising their labor costs. Moreover, the
chaotic certification market in China makes Chinese suppliers be-
lieve that SA8000 is an extortion scheme, paying off auditors in
exchange for a responsible production label. Also, they charge that
SA8000 and other similar standards ignore the reality that most of
the indigenous companies are still in early stages of development and
accumulation of capital. During this stage, many companies lack the
resources for labor protection. Finally, and most importantly, global
buyers refuse to bear the costs of improving labor conditions, which
places suppliers in developing countries in a very difficult economic
situation.
As Professor Jonathan Miller argues, in an externally-dictated
transplant, the receiving party would focus in particular on the costs
and benefits of compliance and noncompliance. 57 The development of
SA8000 and other similar standards in China in recent years is con-
sistent with this theory. Since global buyers with strong bargaining
power condition business on implementation of vendor codes, in order
to obtain business, suppliers accept the condition. However, it is very
difficult for suppliers to faithfully implement the codes because their
implementation (in particular wages, work hours, insurance, and
54. See Social Accountability Accreditation Services, Certified Facilities List,
available at http://www.saasaccreditation.org/certfacilitieslist.htm#summary (last
visited July 11, 2008). As of Mar. 31, 2008, the number of certified facilities by coun-
try: Italy (795), India (267), China (214), Brazil (94), Pakistan (52), Vietnam (38),
Thailand (24), Spain (20), Portugal (11), Taiwan (11), Greece (9), Indonesia (9), and
the Philippines (9). Under SA8000, 872,052 workers were covered (200,215 workers in
India and 186,761in China).
55. See KUAGUO GONGSI DE SHEHUI ZEREN YU ZHONGGUO SHEHUI [SOcIAL RESPON-
SIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS & THE CHINESE SOCIETY] 1-91 (Shen Tan &
Kaiming Liu eds., 2003).
56. For a detailed discussion, see Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social Accountability
Standards in the Global Supply Chain: Resistance, Reconsideration and Resolution in
China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 321 (2007).
57. See Miller, supra note 7, at 876.
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pension) incurs substantial costs and because, as many Chinese sup-
pliers claim, they cannot demand increased prices from foreign
buyers to reflect the costs. 58 Therefore, it is no surprise that many
suppliers falsify labor protection records to get business. 59 The sup-
pliers calculate the compliance level based on a cost-benefit analysis.
In response to the compliance problem, global buyers usually inten-
sify auditing, making code implementation like a cat and mouse
game. 60
Mor bver, as Professor Miller notes, when a transplant is driven
by foreign pressure, it may produce an unintended or counterproduc-
tive response from the receiving country, and such a response may
depend on political and cultural factors prevailing there. 61 The devel-
opment of SA8000 and similar standards in China offers a concrete
example. Some Chinese suppliers have taken unanticipated mea-
sures to respond to the legal transplant by global buyers. Since
Chinese suppliers individually cannot reject the import of vendor
codes by their foreign buyers, some suppliers in the textile and ap-
parel industries, where foreign vendor codes are common, have tried
to gain leverage against foreign vendor codes by forming associations
and developing their own standards. A prominent example is
CSC9000T, which was developed by the China National and Textile
and Apparel Council and other representatives of Chinese corpora-
tions.62 CSC9000T is a social management system. It sets forth
objectives in the areas of management systems, employment con-
tracts, child workers, forced or compulsory labor, working hours,
wages and welfare, trade unions and collective bargaining, discrimi-
nation, harassment and abuse, and occupational health and safety.
At first glance, CSC9000T looks very similar to SA8000. Yet,
CSC9000T is not a set of standards designed for certification. It
builds on a model in which third-party evaluation organizations eval-
uate the suppliers' social performance and give advice on how to
improve it. Therefore, CSC9000T takes a much softer approach than
SA8000. The standards set forth in CSC9000T are long-term goals
58. See Lin, supra note 56; see also Poland Li, CSR in the Supply China, CSR AsIA
WEEKLY, Vol. 24, Week 28, July 2008, at 12 (reporting interviews with suppliers in
China and finding that it seems true that no suppliers really can fully comply with
the standards because suppliers cannot pass the costs to global buyers). CSR Asia is
the leading NGO with a focus of promoting corporate social responsibility in China.
59. See Lin, supra note 56; see also Wal-Mart 2005 Report on Ethical Sourcing
(finding the frequent use of "double books" to hide the numbers of hours worked or
wages/benefits paid by suppliers); Gap, Inc. 2004 Social Responsibility Report (finding
cases of record falsification in 2003 and 2004); Nike FY04 Corporate Social Responsi-
bility Report (finding record falsification is an obstacle in China).
60. See, e.g., Leslie Kaufman & David Gonzalez, Made in Squalor: Reform Has
Limits: Labor Standards Clash with Global Reality, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at Al
(reporting Gap intensified monitoring when finding suppliers' violations).
61. See Miller, supra note 7.
62. See CSC9000T, at http://www.csc9000.org.cn/.
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but do not require immediate compliance. The Chinese suppliers fur-
ther soften the stiffness of social performance by maintaining control
over the whole evaluation process. This process is controlled by the
Responsible Supply Chain Association (RSCA) whose members are
essentially the very companies that are subject to the evaluation pro-
cess. Given the softness of CSC9000T, western buyers and NGOs
may suspect that CSC9000T is merely a contrivance to forge a re-
sponsible production label for Chinese suppliers rather than a
genuine device to protect labor rights. While it may be too early to tell
the true motive behind CSC9000T, based on the 2006 CSC9000T An-
nual Report, it seems that CSC9000T may herald a Chinese way of
implementing socially responsible standards.63 The Annual Report
discloses the identity of ten companies that participated in the exper-
imental program under CSC9000T. It also discloses the preliminary
evaluation results, showing serious and prevalent violations of mini-
mum wages, working hours, and health protection. Such a disclosure
may weaken the suspicion of deception. It also addresses in particu-
lar the harmonious and cooperative interaction between the
evaluated companies and the evaluators during the evaluation pro-
cess, the importance of training and technical support, and the
flexibility of correcting problems with different urgency levels. Al-
though CSC9000T uses so-called "third party evaluation
organizations," it does not stress the independent or adversarial di-
mension that is typically associated with a third-party auditor.
Rather, according to the Report, it is the "cooperative and harmoni-
ous" relationship between the CSC9000T evaluators and the
evaluated companies that inspires corporate commitment to labor
rights improvement. 64 The emphasis on such a cooperative and har-
monious relationship may have its root in the Chinese cultural
preference for non-adversarial mechanisms such as mediation and
conciliatory negotiation to resolve disputes, 65 but it also strongly re-
flects the cross-country finding that capacity-building assistance to
suppliers in developing countries is an important complement to ad-
versarial monitoring for effective implementation of socially
responsible production. 66 In short, faced with SA8000 and similar
63. See CSC9000T, 2006 CSC9000T Annual Reports, Chinese and English ver-
sions available at http://www.csc9000.org.cn (released on Jan. 18, 2007, last visited
Apr. 25, 2007).
64. See id.
65. See Carlos de Vera, Arbitrating Harmony: 'Med-Arb' and the Confluence of
Culture and Rule of Law in the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in
China, 18 COLUM. J. AsiAN L. 149 (2004) (arguing the Chinese arbitration system that
intermingles the conflicting roles of arbitration and mediation, which undermines the
impartiality of arbitrators from a western view, has its root in the Chinese cultural
preference for harmony).
66. See Richard Locke et al., Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards?: Lessons
from Nike (MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper No. 4612-06, July 2006)
(arguing that after surveying over 800 of Nike's suppliers in fifty-one countries, moni-
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standards imposed by global buyers, Chinese suppliers are trying to
find their own way to strike a balance between satisfactory working
conditions and cruel business reality.
B. Environmentally Responsible Production Standards: ISO 14001
ISO 14001 is a set of environmental management standards de-
veloped by the ISO.67 IS014001 was first published in 1996 and
revised in 2004. ISO 14001 is a management tool for an organization
to control the impact of its activities, products, or services on the nat-
ural environment. The environmental management system under
ISO 14001 is process-focused rather than substance-oriented. As a
result, an organization in compliance with ISO 14001 does not itself
guarantee environmentally responsible performance. Still, IS014001
accompanied by auditing mechanisms provides an important tool for
a firm that wants to demonstrate its commitment to environmental
protection.
As of December 2006, China ranked as the second largest coun-
try in the number of IS014001 certificates.68 Empirical studies have
shown that multinational companies' procurement policies presses
Chinese suppliers to be certified under ISO 14001.69 Foreign pres-
sure, however, is not a sufficient account of the rapid growth of ISO
14001 in China because implementation of SA8000 is also en-
couraged by foreign buyers but has so far received limited
acceptance. 70
In contrast to the SA8000's difficult acclimatization to Chinese
society, ISO 14001 enjoys relatively easy acceptance in China. These
toring combined with capacity building supports to suppliers is more conducive to
improving working conditions than monitoring alone); Richard Locke & Monica
Romis, Beyond Corporate Codes of Conduct: Work Organization and Labor Standards
in Two Mexican Garment Factories (MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper
No. 4617-06, Aug. 2006) (arguing that monitoring plus technical and organizational
assistance helps suppliers to improve working conditions).
67. See the website of ISO, at http://www.iso.org/.
68. The top ten countries are as follows: Japan (22,825), China (18,842), Spain
(11,125), Italy (9825), United Kingdom (6070), South Korea (5893), United States
(5585), Germany (5415), Sweden (4411), and France (3047). See ISO, The ISO Survey-
2006, available at http://www.iso.org/iso/survey2006.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2008).
69. See Petra Christmann & Glen Taylor, Globalization and the Environment: De-
terminants of Firm Self-Regulation in China, 32 J. IN'L Bus. STUDIEs 439 (2001);
Petra Christmann & Glen Taylor, Firm Self-Regulation Through International Certi-
fiable Standards: Determinants of Symbolic versus Substantive implementation, 37 J.
INT'L Bus. STUDIEs 863 (2006).
70. There has been a rapid growth of ISO 14001 in China over the last decade,
from only 9 certified facilities as of Dec. 1996 to 8,862 certified facilities as of Dec.
2004. See ISO, The ISO Survey of ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 Certificates: Tenth Cycle
(2000), available at http://www.iso.org/iso/en/iso9000-14000/certification/isosurvey.
html; The ISO Survey of Certifications 2005, available at http://www.iso.org/iso/en/iso
9000-14000/certification/isosurvey.html. Although SA8000 has developed approxi-
mately over the same period (since 1997), there were only 140 certified companies in
China as of Dec. 2006.
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different fates can be attributed to four factors: the content of the
standard, the standard setting process, the goal of the standard, and
the local policy in China.
As to the content, SA8000 is a set of substantive standards, while
ISO 14001 is a set of management process standards. Compared with
the rigidity of substantive standards, the process-oriented feature of-
fers flexibility for different business entities at different development
stages in different regulatory environments. 71 This flexibility allows
them to take local circumstances into account and thus reduces irri-
tation. But it may also indicate that suppliers have more authorized
discretion in maneuvering environmental performance without in-
curring the charge of "falsification."
As to the standard setting process, ISO 14001 is produced
through international negotiation. ISO is composed of national stand-
ardization institutes from 157 countries, comprising of one member
per country.72 Each member body is represented by the most repre-
sentative standardization institution in its country. The
representative institution may be in the public or private sector. The
representative institution of China has always been part of the gov-
ernment. 73 China has participated in the ISO 14001 standard-setting
process since the very beginning. 74 This participation may tone down
the sharp foreign image of the standard. In contrast, the socially re-
sponsible production standards are currently developed either by
western organizations or companies without substantial input from
developing countries in which the standards are actually imple-
mented. This also implies the great potential of ISO 26000, a new set
of socially responsible production standards that will be completed in
71. According to the explanation provided by ISO, ISO 14001 is known as "generic
management system standards." "Generic" means the standard can be applied to any
organization, large or small, whatever its product, in any sector of activities, whether
it is a business enterprise, a public administration, or a government department. See
ISO, ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 - in brief, available at http://www.iso.org/iso/en/iso
9000-14000/understand/inbrief.html.
72. See ISO, Overview of the ISO System, available at http://www.iso.org/iso/enl
aboutiso/introductionlindex.html#two (last visited May 3, 2007).
73. The People's Republic of China became a member of ISO in 1978 with China
Association for Standardization (CAS) as the representative institution. CAS was re-
placed by China National Standardization Institute (CNSI) in 1985. CNSI was
replaced by the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quar-
antine of the People's Republic of China in 1989. Because the governmental
organization reform in China, now Standardization Administration of China (SAC)
established by the State Council of China in 2001, is the representative institution for
China. See http://www.sac.gov.cn/english/cnorg/index2.asp (last visited Aug. 25,
2006).
74. The delegation of the State Environmental Protection Administration of
China participated in the meetings concerning environmental protection (ISO/IEC
SAGE) held by ISO in 1991 and 1992. China also has participated in the meetings
later held by ISO/TC207 since 1993.
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2010 by the ISO.7 5 The participants in the ISO 26000 standard-set-
ting process include not only developed but also many developing
countries such as China. However, ISO 26000 will only be a set of
guidelines rather than certifiable standards. The guideline model
limits the potential of ISO 26000, but it also reflects the actual disa-
greement on labor standards among countries that bring their local
concerns into the negotiation.
With regard to its goal, ISO 14001 is designed with a view to
facilitate trade and remove non-trade barriers.76 The WTO has af-
firmed the link between trade and environment and recognized that
each member country has the right to take measures for environmen-
tal protection so long as they are not arbitrary and discriminatory. 77
Therefore, when countries have conditioned import on diverse envi-
ronmental standards, which may create compliance difficulties for
international traders, ISO 14001 can be seen as a mechanism to coor-
dinate conflicting environmental requirements and international
trade. However, SA8000 does not share the same background. The
trade and labor protection linkage has been hotly debated in recent
years and decisively thrown out of the Doha negotiation agenda. 78
75. See ISO Social Responsibility, at http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/
2000/2122/830949/3934883/3935096/home.html (last visited May 3, 2007).
76. ISO/TC207, the technical committee for ISO 14000 of the ISO, declares that
"ISO/TC 207's vision is the worldwide acceptance and use of the ISO 14000 series of
standards which will provide an effective means to improve the environmental per-
formance of organizations and their products, facilitate world trade and ultimately
contribute to sustainable development" and "TC 207 has tried to create a positive
mechanism for improving trade, while encouraging improvements in environmental
performance. Its challenge now is to help ensure that the standards are used as in-
tended, and not as a barrier to trade." See http://www.tc207.org/about207.asp#back
ground and http://www.tc207.org/faq.asp?Question=15 (last visited May 4, 2007). ISO
has also reached an agreement with WTO with the common goal of promoting a free
and fair global trading system, in which standardizing bodies subject to the agree-
ment are required to develop standards based on the Code of Good Practice for the
Preparation in the WTO's Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and follow
certain notice procedures. See ISO, ISO and Trade, at http://www.iso.org/iso/en/about
iso/introduction/index.html#eight (last visited May 4, 2007).
77. At the end of Uruguay Round in 1994, trade ministers from participating
countries created Trade and Environmental Committee, bringing the environmental
and sustainable issues into the mainstream of the WTO. The Doha negotiation round
also has included environmental issues such as the coordination between the WTO
and multilateral environmental agreements. See also the prominent "Shrimp-Turtle"
case, in which the Appellate Body affirmed countries have the right to take trade
actions to protect environments so long as certain requirements, such as non-discrimi-
nation, are met. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
78. For the literature on trade-labor linkage, see, e.g., Clyde Summers, The Battle
in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Standards, and Societal Values, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 61, 87 (2001) (arguing that "[d]eveloping countries can retain their legitimate com-
parative advantages while recognizing at least minimum fundamental values");
Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Policy & Labor Standards, 14 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 261, 279 (2005) (arguing that trade sanction should apply to violation
of core labor standards and some generally accepted human rights, e.g., genocide, tor-
ture, and detention without trial); Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the
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This means that trade-labor barriers imposed by governments are
hard to defend under the scrutiny of international trade law. SA8000
itself seems to be a trade barrier when adopted by multinational com-
panies in supply chains.
The governmental policy in China also gives a profound account
of the different acceptability of ISO 14001 on the one hand and
SA8000 on the other by Chinese suppliers. ISO 14001 has been trans-
formed into its national legal system and into concrete measures. The
State Environmental Protection Administration of China (SEPA)
started to implement ISO 14001 in several cities in 1996. In 1997, the
SEPA instituted the China Steering Committee for Environmental
Management System Certification (CSCEC) to formally construct the
implementation platform for ISO 14001 in China.7 9 The responsibili-
ties of CSCEC include administering consultation, certification, and
training. The SEPA also had approved thirty-two National Model Ar-
eas for ISO 14001 by the end of January 2007.80 Furthermore, the
SEPA has formalized the establishment procedure of National Model
Areas for ISO 14001 to systematically promote ISO 14001.81 The Chi-
nese government's support is particularly helpful to create a policy
climate that is friendly to ISO 14001. In such a climate, Chinese sup-
pliers do not have a strong position to argue that ISO 14001 is an
unreasonable burden imposed by powerful global buyers. In fact, the
promotion of ISO 14001 is a domestic state policy in China. Even if
Chinese suppliers are not really willing to accept ISO 14001, their
complaint would be suppressed in such a political climate.
C. Evaluation
It is difficult to claim that vendor codes in global supply chains
are successful legal transplants in China if success is measured by
the gap between the law in contracts and the law in implementation.
But the impact of a legal transplant may be an issue much broader
International Trading System to Enforce Violations of Forced and Child Labor, 20
YALE J. INT'L L. 361 (1995).
In the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Declaration, the WTO rejected the use of labor
standards for protectionist purposes and believed the competent organization for la-
bor issues should be ILO. The 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference reaffirmed the
Singapore declaration on labor without any specific discussion. See WTO, Labor Stan-
dards: Consensus, Coherence and Controversy, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto
e/whatise/tife/bey5_e.htm (last visited May 4, 2007).
79. See the official documents concerning the establishment of CSCEC (State
Council [1997] No. 27; Environment [1997] No. 379) issued by the State Council and
the State Environmental Protection Administration of China (on file with author).
80. See the official directory of the model areas issued by SEPA (or ZHB, in Chi-
nese), at http://www.zhb.gov.cn/tech/ISO14000/rkjx/200405/t20040531_90316.htm
(last visited May 4, 2007).
81. See ISO 14000 Guojia Shifan qu Guanli Banfa [Regulations on ISO 14000 Na-
tional Model Areas], effective as of Sept. 1, 2006. The official document (Environment
Development [2006] No. 68) issued by SEPA, available at http://www.sepa.gov.cn/info/
gw/huangfa200605ft20060517_76735.htm (last visited May 4, 2007).
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than the question concerning the implementation/compliance degree
of the transplanted law itself. In fact, the proliferation of vendor
codes in global supply chains creates an opportunity for Chinese
policymakers to reconsider the role of corporations in economic devel-
opment. In other words, legal transplants via private contracting
help some changes in government policy, which in turn affects the
acceptability of the privately transplanted law.
For years, Chinese scholars and policymakers have debated the
reasonableness of vendor codes in global supply chains and the ra-
tionality of CSR, the core idea underlying the vendor codes. The
Chinese literature on CSR topics has grown noticeably in the recent
few years, and it generally assumes vendor codes in global supply
chain trigger the CSR discussion in China.8 2 The idea of CSR im-
ported in the vendor codes helps to create a focus of the discussion.
The debate has very recently settled on accepting the idea of CSR and
of responsible production standards, though with some qualifications
as shown below. The discussion has also resulted in some important
legal reforms. The leading example can be seen in the recently re-
vised Chinese Company Law, which took effect on January 1, 2006.
The law clearly requires Chinese companies to "undertake social re-
sponsibility" in the course of business.8 3 It thus provides a legal
foundation for vendor codes in China.
Also, following the recognition of CSR in the 2006 Company Law,
a number of state-driven CSR initiatives have recently emerged in
China. An important example is the Guide Opinion on the Social Re-
sponsibility Implementation by the Central-Government-Controlled
State-Owned Enterprises ("Guide Opinion") released by the State-
Owned Assets Supervision and Administration of the State Council
(SASAC) .84 The SASAC supervises 150 Chinese state-owned compa-
nies, all of which are large and important. According to the SASAC's
statement, the organization recognizes that there is a proliferation of
CSR initiatives at the global level, including the UN Global Compact,
ISO 26000, and multinational companies' codes of conduct.8 5 But in
the SASAC's view, the contents and measures of CSR in China were
82. By using the term "gongsi shehui zeren" [corporate social responsibility] for
title search in the China Academic Journals Full Text Database, this author found
only 1 article published in 1994, 2 in 1998, 1 in 1999, 1 in 2001. But since 2002, the
literature has grown noticeably: 8 articles in 2002, 15 in 2003, 21 in 2004, 39 in 2005,
172 in 2006, 104 in 2007, and 57 in 2008 (as of Aug.). For an overview of the discus-
sion path, see YOHUAN Li, QIYE SHEHUI ZEREN ZAI ZHONGGUO [CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN CHINA] 4-7 (2007).
83. Article 5 of the 2006 Company Law of the People's Republic of China.
84. See SASAC, Guanyu Zhongyang Qiye Luxing Shehui Zeren de Zhidao Yijian
[The Guide Opinion on the Social Responsibility Implementation by the Central-Gov-
ernment-Controlled State-Owned Enterprises], available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/
nl l80/n1566/n259760/n264851/3621925.html.
85. See SASAC, Press Release, Q&A between the SASAC Official and News Re-
porters, at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/nll80/n1566/n259760/n264866/3621552.html.
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not clear, so the SASAC conducted a two-year study and produced the
Guide Opinion for the Chinese state-owned enterprises to follow.8 6
The SASAC also intends to encourage the Chinese state-owned enter-
prises to set CSR examples for all Chinese companies to follow suit.8 7
It declared that the Guide Opinion is consistent with international
standards but also compatible with the national and organizational
reality in China.88 The Guide Opinion lays out the basic contents of
CSR in China requiring the companies to fulfill a long list of require-
ments: comply with the law; improve product quality; reduce
emission and waste; provide safe, healthy, and clean working condi-
tions and living environments for workers, and; protect workers' legal
rights (such as signing and implementing employment contracts,
launching pay-raise mechanisms, paying the full amount of social in-
surance in a timely manner, strengthening employee training, and
avoiding discrimination, etc.). It also suggests that the companies es-
tablish CSR management and reporting systems. Partly because of
SASAC's promotion, some important Chinese state-owned enter-
prises have already engaged in CSR reporting.8 9 All of these
measures are consistent with vendor codes in global supply chains.
This is not to say that China fully accepts CSR as generally under-
stood in western countries. The SASAC explicitly refers to the UN
Global Compact, which requires companies to "support and respect
the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights; and make
sure they are not complicit in human rights abuses," while the Guide
Opinion implicitly excludes human rights issues from the Chinese
CSR agenda. The exclusion of human rights may be one of the
SASAC's so-called "CSR with Chinese characteristics." In short, the
Chinese government accepts the labor and environmental aspects of
CSR and vendor codes, but it rejects the human rights aspect. In a
political climate where human rights issues are strictly controlled by
the government, it is no surprise to find that no Chinese private CSR
initiatives (e.g., CSC 9000T and the Social Responsibility Guide that
was launched by the Chinese Industrial Companies and Industrial





89. The companies include China National Petroleum Corporation, State Grid,
China Mobile, China Ocean Shipping Group (COSCO), China Huaneng, China
Datang, Sinochem Corporation, Sinopec, SinoSteel, Aluminum Corporation of China,
Bao Steel, CNOOC, etc.
90. Zhongguo Gongye Qiye ji Gongye Xiehui Shehui Zeren Zhinan [The Social Re-
sponsibility Guide of the China Industrial Companies and Industrial Associations],
full text available at CHINA INDusTRY NEWS, Apr. 16, 2008, at A3, http://www.cinn.cn/
show.asp?ClassID=33&id=44792. The guide was launched in Apr. 2008 by eleven in-
dustrial associations in coal, mechanics, steel, petroleum and chemicals, light
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
China has multiple motives for adopting the Chinese version of
CSR. As some Chinese commentators advocate, adopting specifically
Chinese CSR standards can prevent SA8000 or other similar western
standards from becoming universal. 91 In other words, the construc-
tion of Chinese CSR standards can be a defense against the
imposition of western norms.
The reason behind adopting CSR standards in China is not sim-
ply that global buyers require them but also, and probably more
importantly, the Chinese government's domestic economic and politi-
cal interests in adopting the modified version of CSR. The Chinese
government has recognized that the labor-exploitation and environ-
ment-pollution production model has reached a bottleneck in
economic development so that a redirection of macroeconomic devel-
opment strategy is necessary. The Chinese government has recently
employed an array of tax measures and export regulations to force
companies to move up the value chain, from low-skilled and labor-
intensive to high-skilled and technology-intensive work. For example,
it has taken tough measures on labor-intensive and low-technology
manufacturers in export processing zones, including export restric-
tions on nearly 2000 kinds of labor-intensive/low-technology
products, substantial increases in tax rates, and elimination of other
regulatory exemptions. 92 These measures have caused a large wave
of shutdowns or relocations of companies in the economically devel-
oped areas (e.g., the Pearl River Delta), according to scores of major
Chinese news reports. CSR and vendor codes are consistent with the
new economic development policy, helping to purge companies that
cannot meet good social and environmental performance.
Moreover, in the past few years, domestic social and environmen-
tal problems have become serious and even resulted in social unrest,
which may eventually threaten the Chinese Communist Party's rul-
ing authority. In October 2006, the Sixth General Meeting of the
Sixteenth Central Commission of the Chinese Communist Party
made an important declaration that "building a harmonious society"
industry, textiles, building materials, non-ferrous metals, electricity, and mining
industries.
91. See, e.g.,YOHUAN Li, QIYE SHEHUI ZEREN ZAI ZHONGGUO [CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN CHINA] 31 (2007) (arguing that China should take actions to pre-
vent SA8000 from becoming a universal standard); Le-Zhen Huang, Qiye Gongming
Yundong [Corporate Citizenship Movement], CHINA ECON. WEEKLY (P.R.C.) Vol. 41,
Oct. 24, 2005 (reporting that Yu-Ling Ren, Counsellor of the State Council, said that
China has to speed up its research and establish its own corporate social responsibil-
ity standards in order to prevent China from being constrained by the standards set
up by the western countries) (on file with author).
92. See Jiagong Maoyi Xianzhilei Chukou Chanpin Mulu [The Directory of Export
Products in the Restricted Category], Public Notice No. 44 of the China Customs of
the Ministry of Commerce, issued on July 23, 2007 and effective as of Aug. 23, 2007,
the full text of the Notice, available at http:/finance.sina.com.cn/g/20070724/1127381
4818.shtml.
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is a long-term goal of Chinese socialism. According to the declaration,
there are many existing problems that can cause conflicts and dam-
age social harmony, mainly including inequality in regional
development, population pressure and environmental pollution, un-
employment, income inequality, and low accessibility and low quality
of health care and social security. The declaration also makes clear
that solving these problems is currently the principal agenda of the
Chinese Communist Party. CSR and vendor codes in fact address
many of these problems. In this regard, the Chinese government's
adoption of CSR and vendor codes is a measure to implement this
newly-minted political ideology ("social harmony") in China.
In summary, vendor codes in global supply chains have caused
two transplant results in China. First, they have made some Chinese
companies improve their social and environmental performance, al-
though many Chinese suppliers are still struggling to honestly
implement the codes. The gap between the law in contracts and the
law in practice seems still large. Second, the code proliferation in
global supply chains has successfully triggered policy discussion in
China, facilitating some changes in government policy. In other
words, the bottom-up legal transplant has brought about top-down
CSR measures in China that are an important factor influencing the
acceptability of the transplanted law through private contracting.
IV. THEORETICAL DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The existing legal transplant literature generally focuses on relo-
cation of law across jurisdictions through governmental channels
(e.g., legislatures or courts). This Article has directed attention to a
generally ignored phenomenon: law can also be transplanted through
contracting between private parties. Arbitration clauses and codes of
vendor conduct in global commercial contracts are great examples.
The transplanted law in private contracting may include not only pri-
vate law but also, more importantly, public law (e.g., human rights,
labor, and environmental law).
Given that there are alternative ways of legal transplantation,
future research might focus on the differences between legal trans-
plants via governmental and private channels and on the
comparative advantages of each channel in a given context. Let us
here consider some possible advantages of legal transplants through
private contracting.
First, sometimes it may be easier to transplant through private
contracting than through governmental legislation because it may
avoid political or bureaucratic obstacles. It may be easier for two bus-
iness parties to reach an agreement than for a large number of
political representatives to reach a consensus. Second, legal trans-
plants through private contracting can be a potential bottom-up
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approach of legal reform. For example, since some types of law, such
as human rights, are politically-sensitive, some governments may not
be willing to transplant because it may threaten their political power.
But when a transplant is attached to a lucrative commercial transac-
tion, private actors may be well-motivated to transplant the law
despite its political implications. For private parties, business inter-
ests in everyday life are usually far more important than political
ideology enshrined in the political forum. Third, legal transplants
through private contracting may be more likely to take real effect be-
cause private actors in a real business world may know better what
transplants fit their needs and to what extent they would be effective.
When a party to the contract fails to implement the transplanted law,
the other party who is negatively affected by the implementation gap
may have strong incentives to quickly correct the problem through
renegotiation or other remedial measures. For example, when Gap
and Nike were publicly criticized for their suppliers' labor exploita-
tion practices in developing countries, these companies quickly
intensified monitoring their suppliers to ensure compliance with the
transplanted law and therefore to protect their corporate images.
But the possible advantages of legal transplants through private
contracting also imply important risks. For example, although legal
transplants through private contracting may avoid inefficient politi-
cal discussions, they also raise accountability concerns. When a legal
transplant is through governmental legislation, different interested
parties have a chance in the legislative process to air their views, at
least theoretically and in democratic countries. The legislative pro-
cess may serve as a filter to control the suitability of the transplanted
law. The legislative body is held accountable for the result of the
transplant. When a legal transplant occurs through the judiciary, the
courts assume responsibility for the result. The quality and suitabil-
ity of the transplanted law may be assured by the appeal system. But
who is held accountable for the transplant effect when it is the result
of private contracting? Does the private contracting process offer
comparable deliberation and quality control? This is a particularly
acute issue when the transplanted law is regulatory in nature and
has an impact on the interests of third parties who probably do not
have a chance to air their opinions in the contracting process. In the
example of vendor codes in global supply chains, the greatest benefi-
ciaries of the legal transplants are the workers at the factory and the
local communities around the factory. But worker and local commu-
nity participation in the contracting process is usually none or at best
minimal.9 3 Multinational companies are pressured by their major
93. The lack of participation by workers and local communities in developing
countries has been criticized by NGOs. Therefore, more and more multinational com-
panies now begin to take a so-called "stakeholder dialogues" approach to bring the
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markets, mainly in developed countries, to maintain a reputation of
responsibility, but they are also pushed by the same markets to offer
competitive prices. Since suppliers with relatively weak bargaining
power have a narrow profit margin, some of them will falsify labor
and environmental records to protect their profits. This, in turn, will
undercut the function of the transplanted law, i.e., the protection of
workers and environments in the production process. In other words,
the legal transplant through private contracting is extremely vulner-
able to the economic interests of the contracting parties. When these
economic interests do not support the transplanted law, the trans-
plant may be quickly eliminated from the contract, even though the
legal transplant can bring crucial benefits to non-contracting parties
(e.g., workers). Although there is a possibility that non-contracting
parties who have interests in the contract may make claims as "in-
tended third-party beneficiaries" to protect their interests, the Wal-
Mart and GUESS? cases suggest that non-contracting parties stand
little chance to succeed in this regard.9 4 It is not uncommon that sup-
ply contracts even include a "no third-party beneficiaries" clause to
prevent non-contracting parties from making such a claim to begin
with. All this raises serious questions about the reliability of a legal
transplant attached to a private commercial contract as an alterna-
tive to public legal reform.
Also, legal transplants through private contracting may be much
less transparent than transplants through legislative or judicial
processes. Contracts between private entities are usually confiden-
tial. In the vendor code example, the details of the transplanted law
(i.e., the implementation details of vendor codes) are usually confi-
dential and not released to the public. In this fashion, commercial/
trade secrets may be a barrier to transparency.
It is also important to consider the role of lawyers in the con-
tracting process. The major, if not the only, legal experts in the
process are lawyers representing the contracting parties. Do these
stakeholders in the discussion process. But the process is still mainly controlled by
multinational companies and western NGOs.
94. In Aug. 1996, a group of workers filed a law suit against GuEss? for violations
of minimum wages and work hours. One of the workers' claims was based on the
theory of intended third-party beneficiaries. But GuEss? urged workers in the con-
tracting shops to waive their rights to participate in the lawsuit. See ESBENSHADE,
supra note 34, at 2. On Sept. 3, 2005, a group of Bangladeshi, Chinese, Indonesian,
Nicaraguan, and Swazilander workers also launched a suit against Wal-Mart for al-
leged violations of Wal-Mart's vendor code, based on the theory of intended third-
party beneficiaries. But the court dismissed the plaintiffs claim based on the reasons
that third-party beneficiaries can only enforce a contract against the promisor, which
is the suppliers, not Wal-Mart in this case, and Wal-Mart has the right-not the obli-
gation-to inspect the factories. Moreover, when making claims across borders, the
plaintiff in developing countries may also confront the problems such as forum non
conueniens and failure of showing exhaustion of remedies in the plaintiffs home
country.
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lawyers consider the local circumstances on a case-by-case basis, or
do they just copy and paste standard contracts? To find an answer
requires further research. But at least in the case of vendor codes, the
latter alternative seems to be more likely.
Besides the accountability and quality concerns, legal trans-
plants through private contracting also raise efficiency concerns from
a legal reform perspective. The transplanted law in private con-
tracting usually applies to a limited number of parties-Nike's code
of conduct only applies to Nike's suppliers. To effectuate a legal re-
form in a jurisdiction (e.g., setting up safety standards in workplaces
in China) would require numerous negotiations and contracts among
a large number of private parties. In addition, a private legal trans-
plant initiator is unlikely to reach all entities that should be subject
to the transplanted law; it is impossible, and does not make any
sense, for Nike to contract with all manufacturers in China. But the
coexistence of many private initiators to transplant a certain kind of
law through contracting involves the risk of inconsistency, unless
there is coordination between them. For example, although many
multinational companies have adopted vendor codes referring to the
same international law, their codes still vary greatly in detail. Legal
transplants through private contracting therefore may create multi-
ple, and conflicting, legal orders concerning the same issue in the
same jurisdiction. While this is not necessarily bad, as multiple or-
ders may reflect the need for flexibility-different companies may
just need different standards-it is a reason for concern and caution.
It shows that legal transplants through private contracting may not
be an efficient way to carry out a large-scale legal reform.
Still, legal transplants through private contracting may play an
experimental role in the legal reform process. A legal transplant
through private contracting can test on a small scale whether the
transplanted law is compatible with the institutional environments
of a receiving country and allow quick modifications through renego-
tiation. If the experimentation succeeds, a legal transplant through
private contracting may be upgraded to a legal transplant through
legislation, and based on the information gained by the experiment, it
may be easier for the government in the receiving country to choose a
transplant that is compatible with the local environment.
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